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In this paperwe study the role of the distribution platform as an important determinant of price of paid apps.We
also examine how the distribution platform inﬂuences the price implications of important developers' app-level
decisions. To these purposes, we construct a hierarchical model of price formation by using an ad-hoc panel
dataset consisting of top paid apps from the two major app stores, namely Apple's App Store and Google Play.
Our ﬁndings show that prices of paid apps strongly depend on the platform where the apps are marketed.
Speciﬁcally, the App Store is associated with lower prices for paid apps than Google Play. We ﬁnd evidence
that this is because the impact of cross-store differences in developer competition prevails over the impact of
cross-store differences in average consumer willingness to pay. We also ﬁnd that the price premiums as a return
to trialability are more likely to emerge in Google Play than in the App Store, and that developers are more likely
to adopt a penetration price policy in Google Play, thus implying an inﬂuence of the distribution platform on the
price implications of these app-level decisions. Finally, our evidence does not conﬁrm the argument that a more
marked price reduction for paid apps embedding ads or generating revenues from other interested third parties
should be observed in Google Play.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In the very last few years, mobile software applications (apps,
hereafter) have become important components of people's everyday
life. As amatter of fact, the time per day spent by US consumers using
apps increased by 35% in 2012, and was higher than the time spent
on the web and quite close to that spent watching TV [32]. Also,
recent estimates suggest that the revenue generated from customers
buying and downloading apps for smartphones and tablets will step
from $26 billion in 2013 up to $77 billion in 2017, whereas the number
of downloads will increase from 102 billion to 268 billion [25,41].
Although apps for mobile devices have been around since the late 90s,
the app market started soaring in 2008 when Apple introduced the ap-
plication store distribution paradigm. An application store is essentially
an online distribution platform from which users can download apps
developed by third parties for mobile devices and operating systems
(OS) supported by the platform. Nowadays two app stores undoubtedly
dominate the scene accounting for almost 90% of global app downloads:
Apple's App Store and Google Play [25].
While the rapid growth of the appmarket offers numerous business
opportunities to a multitude of app developers, it also provides a great
opportunity for researchers to examine various theoretical issues like
innovation, entry and exit strategies, platform leadership, externalities,
and marketing mix [7]. Initial studies have mostly concentrated on app
demand estimation and the factors driving such demand across major
app stores [11,24,26] or the determinants of app success [33,34]. In
this paper, we instead focus on the role of the distribution platform in
price formation of paid apps. Paid apps accounted for 75% of the revenue
of app stores worldwide in 2013 and are expected to play a prominent
role also in the future [41]. In addition, industry ﬁgures document that
price levels of paid apps change signiﬁcantly across stores, suggesting
that pricing decisions could depend on the distribution platform [10].
Therefore, from a practical perspective, enhancing the understanding
about the impact of the distribution platform in price formation of paid
apps is clearly important to developers who have adopted the paid app
business model, as it can help them ﬁne-tune their pricing decisions to
the chosen targeted platform. From a theoretical perspective, elucidating
the rationale behind the potential emergence of differences in price
levels across different online platforms is also particularly relevant for
the literature on online price formation. In fact, although price formation
across online retailers has been extensively studied in the past decade in
the electronic commerce literature [6,9,13–15,27,37,40,55], the insights
derived from these studies might not necessarily apply to app stores.
Indeed, there exist two fundamental differences, which distinguish app
stores from traditional online retailers and thus motivate our study on
the role of the distribution platform in the app market.
First, online stores examined by previous studies are pure merchants
who purchase from producers and resell to customers by charging a
retail price based on the wholesale price set by upstream ﬁrms [28,29].
For this reason, the differences in price levels across stores documented
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by prior works are mostly explained by the different pricing and service
policies experimented by online retailers, thus implying the existence of
a signiﬁcant store effect in online price formation [6,15,16,59]. Conversely,
such practices are unlikely to be the sources of price differences across
stores in the context of apps. This is because the prices to ﬁnal customers
are set directly by developers,who then share the revenue from each unit
sold with the platform owner according to a ﬁxed sharing rule, common
to all major stores.
A second crucial difference lies in the unique relationship between
the mobile OS/device market and the app market. Once consumers
choose their favorite OS/mobile device (e.g., Apple or Android), they
are locked in by this decision, as they rely exclusively on the sponsored
platform to source their apps.1 This implies that the customer base in a
given platform strictly depends on the customer base of the associated
product, i.e., the mobile device and the relative OS. Different mobile
device makers and/or OS providers naturally target different segments
based on their product quality and marketing capabilities. In particular,
with regard to the two major mobile device ecosystems, there exist
several important differences between consumers accessing the App
Store and those populating Google Play. Speciﬁcally, Apple targets
exclusively the (loyal) high-end of the market, whereas the sales of
Android devices are mostly fueled by low-end segments of the market
[3,4,17,18,26,30]. Moreover, Apple users tend to be heavier and less
tech-savvy mobile users than Android users [17,26,30] As explained
later, these differences imply that app developers face signiﬁcantly
different consumer segments in terms of willingness to pay across
different platforms [3,4,17,18,26,30], while this is unlikely to be the
case in traditional online stores. This is because in the latter stores
consumers are not forced to bear any exclusive relationship with the
distribution channel, as there is no associated product and/or platform
technology locking them in. Thus, the heterogeneity in the willingness
to pay of consumers buying the same item (e.g., the same electronic
device brand) across two traditional online retailers, e.g., Amazon.com
and Newegg.com, is much lower than in the case of consumers buying
the same app in App Store and Google Play. This particular feature of
the app market implies that, differently from online retailers studied
in previous literature, app stores can be viewed as distinct markets
where developers might be required to set different prices, even for
the very same item. Therefore, the role of the distribution platform in
price formation of paid apps should stem from driving forces that are
different from those highlighted in previous studies, and thus, need to
be unraveled.
Our paper aims at ﬁlling this important gap by investigating the role
of the distribution platform as an important determinant of price of paid
apps. In particular, we aim at answering the following research questions,
which have never been examined before:
1) Does the distribution platformwhere paid apps aremarketed have a
direct inﬂuence on their price formation?
2) Does the distribution platform chosen for paid apps inﬂuence the
price implications of certain important app-level decisions?
Therefore, the scope of this paper is to shed light on whether and
how the distribution platform matters in price formation of paid apps,
both via its direct inﬂuence on prices and via its moderating role of
the relationships between certain important app-level decisions and
app prices. To provide an answer to the above questions we compare
prices of top (i.e., most downloaded) paid apps from the two most
important distribution platforms, i.e., Apple's App Store and Google
Play, and construct a hierarchical model of app price formation, taking
into account potential non-random selection issues by means of the
propensity score matching (PSM) method [50].
In detail, our contribution is twofold.With regard to the ﬁrst question,
we explain that the distribution platform has a direct impact on prices
emerging from two contrasting store-level forces. On the one hand, the
higher average willingness to pay of consumers in the App Store, as
implied by their higher levels of income and app usage and lower levels
of technology consciousness, favors higher prices for paid apps in this
store. On the other hand, the lower in-store developer competition favors
higher prices for paid apps inGoogle Play, in light of the lowerwillingness
to pay of consumers and the higher app customization costs, whichmake
this store less attractive to developers. Results from our sample show that
Google Play is associatedwith higher prices for paid apps, suggesting that
the effect of competition is dominant.With regard to the second question,
we argue and ﬁnd that the distribution platform can also inﬂuence the
relationships between important app-level decisions and price of paid
apps. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the positive effect of offering a free trial
version on the price of the full paid version is more likely to emerge in
Google Play, as consumers with lower willingness to pay are more sensi-
tive to the uncertainty surrounding the app value. We also ﬁnd that,
differently from the App Store, the lower willingness to pay of consumers
in Google Play limits developers' ability to resort to price skimming, and
leads them to adopt a penetration price strategy when launching new
apps. However, we do not ﬁnd support for our hypothesis that the distri-
bution platform inﬂuences the effect of the presence of alternative app
revenue streams generated from advertisers or other interested third
parties on the app price.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
present our theoretical arguments and discuss the related hypotheses.
In Section 3, we describe the data, the variables and the methods
utilized in this paper. In Section 4, we present our empirical ﬁndings
and discuss their implications. In Section 5, we discuss some robustness
checks. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2. Theory and hypotheses
The central tenet of our arguments is that the distribution platform
matters for price formation of paid apps in two ways. First, the chosen
distribution platform— App Store vs. Google Play— has a direct impact
on the price of a paid app, ensuing from several characteristics that lead
to two contrasting store-level forces, i.e., cross-store differences in
consumer willingness to pay and in the level of in-store developer
competition. Second, the distribution platform also impacts prices
indirectly, by inﬂuencing the price implications of three important
developers' decisions at the app level.
2.1. The main effect of the distribution platform on price of paid apps
In our view, the impact of the distribution platform on price levels of
paid apps may arise as a result of several relevant differences existing
between the two major platforms. First, industry studies suggest that
Apple's customer base can count on higher average income than
Android-based devices' customer base [3,4,17,18,26,30]. Second, these
studies further show that Apple consumers tend to be heavier mobile
users (they spend more time on their apps) and enthusiastic early
adopters of newmobile technologies [17,30]. Therefore, Apple consumers
have on average more money to spend on their apps and also a greater
need to improve their smartphones' functionalities and consumption
experience. Third, it is recognized that Android users tend to be relatively
more tech-savvy thanApple users as they aremore associatedwith tech-
nical and computer-related jobs and they follow technology news more
frequently [26,30]. Because of their knowledge, they tend to be more
cautious and far-sighted in their purchases (for instance by comparing
more alternatives), as compared with Apple users, who are instead
more addicted consumers [30]. These characteristics unambiguously
suggest that Apple users tend to be more prone to spend their money
on apps, and thus have higher average willingness to pay than users of
Google Play [3,4,17,18,26,30]. In turn, this should play in favor of higher
prices for paid apps in the App Store.
1 Ghose and Han [26] report that, at any given point in time, consumers usually own
either Apple or Android devices.
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However, a further important difference between the two platforms
is that Android OS is released under an open source license, as opposed
to Apple iOS, which runs only for Apple devices. This means that
Android is a more ﬂexible system which runs on multiple devices
(and target more heterogeneous customer base), but also implies the
existence of greater device fragmentation and thus higher development
costs, due to the need for developers in Google Play to customize apps
for different smartphones to fully exploit this ﬂexibility and reach a
plethora of consumers [1,22]. Since development costs are ﬁxed costs,
they do not have a direct impact on price. Yet, according to the industrial
organization literature [54], they may still have an indirect inﬂuence on
price by affecting the level of competition. Indeed, higher development
costs work as a stronger barrier to deter developers' entries in the
platform. In turn, this plays in favor of milder levels of competition in
Google Play because a lower number of developers will actually prefer
to enter and compete in this market. Cross-store differences in the
level of developer competition are further ampliﬁed by the aforemen-
tioned different willingness to pay of consumers populating the two
stores. Indeed, developers are more stimulated to enter and compete
in theApp Store than inGoogle Play because they can potentially extract
higher value from consumers with higher willingness to pay [46].2
Industry ﬁgures corroborate the presence of a higher level of competition
in the App Store, suggesting that developers in the App Store are almost
twice as those inGoogle Play [38]. Suchdifference becomes even stronger
when considering only paid apps. In fact, a larger number of developers
prefer selling paid apps in the App Store [57]. As a result, the higher
competition in the App Store should drive lower prices for paid apps
in this store as compared with Google Play.
Summingup, the distribution platform should have an impact on the
prices of paid apps, as a result of the store-related factors discussed
above. On the one hand, the App Store should be associatedwith higher
prices for paid apps than Google Play, because consumers accessing the
former store tend to be wealthier, more app-addicted and less tech-
savvy, and thus they are on average more willing to pay for apps. On
the other hand, Google Play should be the platform associated with
higher prices for paid apps, as this store attracts less competition in
light of the lower willingness to pay of its customers and the higher
app customization costs. As there is no theoretical argument a priori
to anticipate which of the two effects actually prevails, we formulate
two alternative hypotheses on the overall net effect of the distribution
platform, as follows:
H1a. App Store is associated with higher prices than Google Play for
paid apps, due to the higher average consumer willingness to pay.
H1b. App Store is associated with lower prices than Google Play for
paid apps, due to the higher level of in-store developer competition.
2.2. The role of the distribution platform in the effect of developer decisions
at the app level on paid app price
In this section, we explain that the distribution platform can play a
role in price formation of paid apps also by inﬂuencing the impact of
three important developers' decisions at the app level — i.e., offering a
free trial version, adopting alternative revenue streams (e.g., revenue
from advertising), and choosing an introductory pricing scheme for
new products— on the price of paid apps. Indeed, while the price im-
plications of these app-level decisions have been extensively studied
for information goods [20,23,36,51], little attention has been devoted to
understand whether and how these implications depend on the choice
of the online distribution channel. More speciﬁcally, we argue that in
the appmarket, it is important from a pricing perspective for the chosen
app-level decision to be made by taking into account the distribution
platformwhere the paid app ismarketed. In particular, the characteristics
of the consumer segments developers inherit from the associated device
makers and/or OS providers should be considered.
2.2.1. The role of the distribution platform in the price effect of a free trial
version release
In general, trialability measures the extent to which potential
adopters perceive that they have an opportunity to experiment with
an innovation prior to committing to its usage [2,43,49]. Through a
trial version users can test the product and resolve the uncertainty
about its real value to them [56]. Also, trialability can serve to signal
product quality as the knowledge that a product is available in a free
trial version represents some sort of guarantee to customers. For these
reasons, consumers generally pay higher price if given the opportunity
to test the product before buying, consistent with the idea that they
place value on reduced uncertainty surrounding the product [23].
Developers often release a free trial version associated with the paid
version of their apps in both theApp Store andGoogle Play. Our argument
is that the price implications of offering a free trial version depend on the
distribution platform where the paid app is marketed. We point out that
consumerswith different willingness to paymay have a different percep-
tion about the uncertainty surrounding the value of an app, and thus they
could react differently to price strategies of developers. Consumers with
more limited willingness to pay (e.g., because of the limited budget or
the lower need to use apps) could perceive higher risk in buying an app
of unknown value, despite the rather small price. This is because, as
compared with consumers characterized by higher willingness to pay,
they are more likely to realize a negative surplus when the wrong app
is purchased. Moreover, for consumers with lower willingness to pay, a
wrong purchase may also be more likely to preclude the opportunity to
substitute the wrong app with a better alternative, given that this
would require spending additional money and thus would more likely
lead to a negative surplus. Therefore, the release of a free trial version
able to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the app value should provide
higher beneﬁts to consumerswho are in general lesswilling to pay. Since,
higher price premiums for the full paid version are gained as a return to
trialability [23], our argument implies that consumers who are in general
less willing to pay should be more likely to recognize such price pre-
miums for the full paid version to the developers that help them resolve
product uncertainty by releasing a free trial version. In other words, the
positive impact of the free trial release on the price of the full paid version
is more likely to emerge when selling to consumers characterized by a
lower willingness to pay because of the higher risks they perceive in
buying an app of unknown value. As industry evidence has clearly
shown that consumers have more limited willingness to pay in Google
Play than in the App Store, the above considerations suggest that the
positive effect of trialability on the price of the full paid version is more
likely to be observed in the former store. Hence, we formulate the
following hypothesis:
H2. The positive effect of trialability on the price of paid apps depends
on the distribution platform. In particular, such an effect is more likely
to emerge in Google Play.
2.2.2. The role of the distribution platform in the price effect of in-app
advertising and other revenue streams
A considerable number of developers of paid apps seek to monetize
not only from the price consumers pay to download apps, but also from
enabling advertisements inside apps. For instance, several paid game
apps, among others, contain third parties' ads (although with minor
intensity as compared with free apps). Apps displaying ads can
2 This is facilitated by the fact that the entry barriers in the app market tend to be rela-
tively modest, except for the discussed customization costs, which however play in the
same direction as the consumer willingness to pay. That is, they reinforce the higher at-
tractiveness of the App Store over Google Play, and thus induce ﬁercer in-store developer
competition in the former store.
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attract consumers who are interested in using the app on one side,
and advertisers interested in advertising their products to users
within the app on the other side. Third parties interested in app
users are not limited to advertisers. Indeed, developers of apps
such as social networking applications pursue the strategy of building
a large user base to attract, in addition to app users, ﬁrms interested
in consumer information for commercial purposes (referred to as info
seekers). In this case, developers, e.g., WhatsApp Inc., may also earn
from selling non-personally identiﬁable information [58].
The interest of third parties in advertising their products inside the
app (or in acquiring app user information) naturally increases with
the number of consumers utilizing the app because their audience (or
the base of information) becomes larger. That is, app users exert large
positive cross-side externalities on third parties. In this case a proﬁtable
pricing strategy would imply to target aggressively, i.e., subsidize, the
side of users (the app users in our case) who are able to exert a larger
positive externality on other side (e.g., advertisers), and monetize
from the latter [45,48,35]. As a consequence, we should observe that,
ceteris paribus, paid apps generating revenue streams from third parties
interested in app users (e.g., ads-supported apps), have lower prices
than those that do not exhibit such characteristic. This is because devel-
opers would subsidy app users to take advantage from the fact that a
large user base will attract third parties (such as advertisers or info
seekers) from which to monetize. In contrast, developers of apps that
do not rely on these alternative revenue streams donot have such an in-
centive to reduce the price to users given that they cannot monetize
from interested third parties.
We examinewhether the effect of the presence of in-app advertising
or other revenue streams generated from third parties interested in app
users (e.g., info seekers) hinges upon the chosen distribution platform.
Our argument is that the magnitude of the price reduction necessary
to attract a sufﬁciently large user base heavily depends on the type of
consumers buying that app. Indeed, the extent of the price reduction
also depends on the price sensitiveness of the consumers receiving
such reduction. That is, larger price reductions should be offered when
these consumers are more price-sensitive, and thus less willing to pay
[21,45,48]. As app stores feature signiﬁcantly different consumers in
terms of willingness to pay on average, this argument suggests that
when a developer decides to monetize from in-app advertising or
other revenue streams generated from third parties interested in app
users, the price implications of such decisions should differ across app
stores. In particular, we should expect larger price reductions, if any,
for consumers inGoogle Play than in theAppStore, given the lower con-
sumer willingness to pay in the former store. Hence, we can formulate
the following hypothesis:
H3. The negative effect of the presence of in-app advertising or other
revenue streams generated from third parties interested in app users
on the price of paid apps depends on the distribution platform. In partic-
ular, such an effect is more likely to emerge in Google Play.
2.2.3. The role of the distribution platform in the introductory pricing policy
The choice of the introductory pricing policy for new products has
been extensively studied in the marketing literature [42,44,52,53].
When launching a newproductﬁrms can balance between two extreme
pricing schemes, namely market skimming or market penetration [19,
42]. Under a skimming policy, ﬁrms initially set a high price targeting
high-value customers. Then, as the productmoves forward in its lifecycle,
its price is gradually decreased to attract less valuable segments. In
contrast, a penetration policy implies setting a lowprice at ﬁrst to capture
a large market base. Then, once a large market base is established, the
price can be raised.
In the appmarket the existence of considerable word-of-mouth and
other network effects among users should induce developers of many
apps to leverage on a penetration policy to exploit the advantage of a
large installed market base [20,36,51]. In this case, an app ﬁrst released
should have a lower price than amoremature app, ceteris paribus. That
is, the price of the app should increase with the app age [52]. However,
numerous successful apps have unique features that cannot be easily
imitated or substituted. Furthermore, for many apps there may be
users who are highly valuable. For instance, passionate gamers can
certainly afford to purchase their preferred app right after the release
at any price. In this case developers could prefer skimming this segment
and later decrease the price to target less addicted users, due to the
presence of high customer heterogeneity and product differentiation
[19,44,53]. Under the circumstances, an app ﬁrst released should
instead have a higher price than an app already mature in the market,
ceteris paribus. That is, the price of the app should decrease with the
app age [52].
The above considerationswould suggest that in the appmarket both
pricing schemes are equally plausible, thus yielding no univocal predic-
tion on the relationship between the age of the paid app and its price.
We suggest that the pattern of the price of new apps could be better
understood after taking into account the role of the distribution platform.
We argue that in Google Play there could be limited room for a price
skimming policy. Since price skimming aims at capturing the high end
of a market, it requires the existence of a group of highly valuable
consumers who are willing to pay signiﬁcantly more than the others for
the product. This market segment could be relatively small or less devel-
oped in Google Play, where consumers generally tend to have lower
willingness to pay as compared with those in the App Store. On the
other hand, price penetration could be more impactful in this platform,
as users who are in general less willing to pay (i.e., the vast majority in
Google Play) would respond more favorably to lower initial prices, thus
facilitating the establishment of an ample consumer base. The situation
is different in the App Store. In this platform consumers are more willing
to pay than those in Google Play (for instance, because they arewealthier
and heavier users). Thus, it is possible for a considerable number of devel-
opers to beneﬁt from skimming high-end segments ﬁrst by charging
themhigher prices. At the same time, other developers could also succeed
by using a penetration policywhen their apps feature important network
externalities. Accordingly, in Google Play developers should be more
likely to implement a penetration policy rather than a skimming one.
Thus, in this store we should observe that, ceteris paribus, younger
paid apps are on average priced lower than more mature paid apps as
prices gradually increase over time under a penetration price policy.
Conversely, since both penetration and skimming schemes could
work effectively in the App Store, it is difﬁcult to predict the dominance
of either policy. Hence, we simply formulate the following:
H4. Developers are more likely to use a price penetration policy in
Google Play than in the App Store.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Data
To test the above hypotheses, we built an ad hoc dataset by collecting
data of top (i.e., most downloaded) paid apps for smartphones in the
Italian version of App Store and Google Play. We recorded data from the
top paid app ranking publicly available in each of these platforms on a
daily basis in the period going from March 7th to May 15th, 2013 (60
observation periods in total).
Top app rankings have been utilized by prior research analyzing the
app market (e.g., [11,24]). Similarly to Carare [11], we restricted our
focus to the top 100 apps. There are several important reasons for
whyall studies consider top app rankings. First, these rankings are easily
available from the app stores. Second, the insights obtained from studying
successful apps, rather than average apps, can be certainly more useful to
developers that are planning the development and marketing of new
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apps. Third andmost important, although bothApp Store andGoogle Play
count more than one million applications available for download, the
actual number of apps that are displayed to consumers is much more
limited. In both stores consumers have access only to web pages
displaying top rankings (e.g., top free, top paid, top grossing) for all
apps, top rankings within each app category or top new entries and
sponsored apps. Essentially only the very top portion of the app market
is actually visible to consumers. This implies that top rankings are
arguably the primary source of information not only for researchers to
study this novel market, but also for consumers to make their purchase
decisions, as highlighted also by Carare [11]. Furthermore, besides their
absolute relevance [41], we naturally restrict to the top paid apps and
avoid considering top free apps (i.e., the most downloaded free apps),
as our focus is to understand the role of the distribution platform in
price formation of paid apps. In this respect, we are consistent with
previous econometric analyses on price formation, which considered
non-zero prices [8]. Similarly, top grossing rankings were also excluded,
given the presence of numerous free apps in this ranking. Finally, our
choice of observing apps in a time span of about two months is in line
with previous studies [11,24]. After recording the top 100 paid apps
from the two stores along the entire period of observation we obtained
a rich dataset containing 11,999 observations related to 567 apps (402
apps in App Store and 165 app in Google Play, respectively), that have
appeared at least once in the top paid ranking of one of the two stores
during the observation period.3 By construction, our sample is an unbal-
anced panel dataset asmore successful apps appear in the rankingsmore
often than others.
3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Dependent variable
Our theoretical arguments look at the relationship between prices of
paid apps and the distribution platform, aswell as the role of the distribu-
tion platform in inﬂuencing the price implications of three app-level deci-
sions. Hence, our dependent variable is the logarithmof the daily price (in
Euros) of each app featured in the top 100 paid apps rankings of the two
platforms during our period of observation. The logarithmic transforma-
tion is common in pricing literature [60–62].
3.2.2. Independent variables
Our H1a and H1b suggest that the distribution platform chosen for a
paid app will inﬂuence its price. H1a suggests that the App Store will be
associatedwith higher prices for paid apps thanGoogle Play because con-
sumers accessing the former store tend to be wealthier, more app-
addicted and less tech-savvy, and thus they are on average more willing
to pay for apps. In contrast, H1b predicts the opposite outcome because
of the higher level of in-store competition among developers in the App
Store as comparedwith Google Play. To test these predictions we ﬁrst in-
troduce a dummy variable, namely Store, which is equal to one if on a
given day an app-store pair (i.e., an app in a given store) is observed in
the top 100 paid app ranking of Google Play, zero if observed in the top
100 paid app ranking of App Store. Based on the sign of the reported co-
efﬁcient on our dummy Storewe can assess whether one of the two op-
posing effects we have theorized dominates the other, giving rise to
signiﬁcant differences in prices across stores. Therefore, ourﬁrst set of hy-
potheses looks at the overall net effect of the distribution platform on the
price of paid apps. However, besides providing evidence that prices of
paid apps signiﬁcantly differ between Apple and Google, we also provide
further evidence to show that the differences captured by our dummy
Store can be ascribed to the underlying forces we propose —
i.e., store-level willingness to pay and in-store developer competi-
tion. Speciﬁcally, with regard to the store-level competition, we ﬁrst
show that there exist signiﬁcant differences in the level of in-store de-
veloper competition between the two platforms and then explicitly in-
troduce a store-level developer competition variable in our models
under the expectation that it should have a negative impact on prices.
In this respect, we take advantage of the fact that in-store
developer competition can vary over time because developers' entries
(and exits) are very dynamic in this market and thus it is possible to
measure the impact of changes in the level of developer competition
on app prices.
With regard to the store-level willingness to pay, we note that such
factor is very stable over time (especially as compared with app price),
as it descends from strategic choices related to the type of market
segments targeted by the associated device and/or OS providers. As a
matter of fact, using secondary data on consumer willingness to pay for
a larger time span (i.e., 2011–2014),we always observe a large andpersis-
tent gap inwillingness to pay between Apple and Google users. Thus, any
measure of store-level willingness to pay has almost zero variation in the
sample and is extremely correlatedwith the dummy Store, thusmaking it
difﬁcult to discern its direct effect on prices from the overall net effect.
Therefore, to isolate the direct effect of cross-store differences in con-
sumer willingness to pay, we exploit the cross-sectional variation in
the value of appswithin each store, relying on the fact that, for informa-
tion goods, price levels mostly reﬂect the consumer willingness to pay
when the effect of other relevant factors (i.e., competition) becomes
negligible [23,51,54]. Speciﬁcally, we consider the subsample of low
value apps (deﬁned as those belonging to the lowest price quartile
within each of the two app rankings) to demonstrate that store-level
consumer willingness to pay plays a role in driving cross-store differ-
ences in app prices, particularly favoring higher prices in the App
Store. Indeed, for low value apps, cross-store differences in competition
and the relative effect on the emergence of cross-store price differences
should be considerably weakened, thus allowing a better disentangle-
ment of the effect of cross-store differences in consumer willingness
to pay. This is because, as compared with their “colleagues” in the App
Store, developers in Google Play tend to concentrate more on commer-
cializing low value (low price) apps, rather than high value (high price)
apps, given that they can easily anticipate that, on average, Android
users are more reluctant to pay high prices. As a consequence, while in
general there exist high cross-store differences in developer competition
(with the App Store displaying higher competition), when considering
only low value apps the competition levels between the two stores tend
to become closer. With a reduced role of cross-store differences in devel-
oper competition, our dummy Store should mostly capture the direct ef-
fect of the store-level consumer willingness to pay, if any, as this effect
should emerge more strongly in this case, favoring higher prices in the
App Store.
As discussed above, we use a measure of store-level competition
in addition to the dummy Store. However, as the number of sales or
downloads of each developer in a given store is not disclosed, we cannot
compute measures of competition based on market shares. In addition,
the vast majority of apps and developers are never displayed on the
pages of the two stores. Therefore, it is not possible to retrieve time-
varying information on the number of all developers in a platform and
the number of their apps. In turn, this impedes the calculation of a
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) based on these data. To overcome
this problem, we measure the extent of developer turnover in the top
paid apps ranking of the store. In fact, it is straightforward that a larger
turnover in the daily composition of top 100 ranking (in terms of
developers) reﬂects ﬁercer competition among developers to increase
download as well as higher intensity of new market entries. Note that
this choice is consistent with a consolidated stream in the industrial
organization literature using measures of ﬁrms' turnover in the market
to reﬂect the level of competition [5,12,31]. To construct ourmeasure of
3 The number of observations is 11,999 instead of 12,000 because we were not able to
retrieve accurate and extensive information about one app appearing only once in the
top ranking of Google Play. Moreover, the number of distinct apps is actually 524. This is
because there are 43 apps available in the top 100 paid apps rankings of both stores during
the observation period. Nevertheless, as explained later, according to our hierarchical
model of price formation we consider the app-store pairs, which are indeed 567, as our
statistical units.
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in-store competition (namely, Turnover) we compute the number of
developers that never appeared in the top ranking of paid apps during
our observation period over the seven days before the given day of
observation.4 It is important to note that our measure of competition
is even more accurate than those that could be ideally computed
based on the number of apps of all developers in the store (if it were
possible to compute them precisely). This is because, with a multitude
of apps “invisible” to consumers, the majority of developers of such
apps are never a threat to developers of top apps, and a measure
based on such information would not capture the real level of competi-
tion among developers.5
To test our H2, which suggests that the positive impact of trialability
on the price of a paid app is more likely to be associated with Google
Play than with App Store, we retrieve information on the existence of
a free trial version for the app from the descriptions provided by app
developers in the given store, and introduce a dummy (Free trial version)
indicating whether the developer offers a free trial version for the paid
app or not, as well as its interaction with our Store dummy.6 In our H3
we maintain that the effect of the presence of in-app advertising or
other revenue streams generated from third parties interested in app
users (e.g., info seekers) on price should be especially evident in Google
Play given the lower willingness to pay of consumers accessing this
store. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed each app to check for the pres-
ence of ads inside the app, as we had no access to revenue information
from third parties, e.g. advertisers. In addition, we included all apps
belonging to the social networking app category. This is because,
as also suggested in their service provision policies, these apps
(e.g., WhatsApp) canmonetize from selling (non-personally identiﬁ-
able) data of a large user base to interested third parties. Accordingly,
we introduce a dummy variable (Ads & other revenue streams) equal to
one if the given app contains ads inside and/or belongs to the social
networking category, as well as its interaction with the dummy Store.
To test our H4, which suggests that developers are more likely to
adopt a penetration price policy in Google Play than in App Store, we
followed the marketing literature examining penetration vs. skimming
policies and recorded the release date of the app in the given store [52].
Similarly to previous studies, this allowed us to compute the time
(number of days) since the app has been available for download in
the given store (Time since release), i.e., the app age, and interact this
variable with the dummy Store. Indeed, if developers in a store tend to
adopt on average a penetration (skimming) policy, this measure should
have a positive (negative) impact on prices indicating that, as apps
move forward in their lifecycle, developers tend to increase (decrease)
their price [52].7
Finally, in addition to the above variables of interest, we control for a
number of other factors, whichmay inﬂuence app price formation. First,
in addition to the store-level competition variable, we introduce a
variablemeasuring competition at the app level in a given store. Indeed,
different apps could have a different number of substitutesmarketed by
other developers in the given store. To compute this measure, we con-
sidered all the appsmarketed by the developers observed in our sample.
Based on this population, we computed for each app the number of
(both paid and free) substitutes at a given time (Substitutes). Note that
by doing so, we did not only consider the apps appearing in top 100
paid app rankings, but also those apps not appearing in the ranking, as
long as they were developed and marketed by the developers present
in our sample. This is consistent with our earlier argument that the
major threats for an app likely come from developers that have been
able to market their apps more successfully. To identify app substitutes
accurately, we created 69 subcategories based on the real scope and
functionalities of the given apps retrieved from the descriptions provided
by developers. Also note that, by including free apps in computing the
variable Substitutes, we explicitly capture the effect of the presence of
free apps on the price of paid apps. We also control for the app category
(we count 14 categories in our sample as indicated in Table 1), the type of
developer (Developer type), i.e., whether the app provider is a ﬁrm or
(group of) individual(s), the number of appsmarketed by each observed
developer in the given day and store (Number developer apps), and the
app size in Megabyte (App size). We also control for whether in-app
purchase (i.e., the opportunity to directly upgrade to additional features
inside the app) is implemented for the given paid app, by introducing a
dummy variable (In-app purchase). Furthermore, given that users can
rate the apps they download, we recorded such information for each
app to construct a measure of app quality. Both App Store and Google
Play allow users to provide apps' rating on a 1-to-5 scale where 1 corre-
sponds to the worst valuation and 5 to the best valuation. However,
sometimes no rating is displayed for certain apps because the number
of users who have provided a rating is too low. To cope with this issue,
we construct four dummies based on the rating: low rated apps (Low
app rating) category if the app rating is below 2.5, medium rated apps
(Medium app rating) category if the app rating is between 2.5 and 3.5,
high rated apps (High app rating) category if the app rating is above 3.5,
and a category of apps displaying no rating (No app rating).8 We also
control for the extent of developer notoriety by including a dummy
(Developer fame), which indicates whether the developer of the given
app is worldwide established.9
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in
our study. On average, prices of paid apps in Google Play are consider-
ably higher than those in the App Store (3.41 and 1.87, respectively),
and both stores display signiﬁcant within-store price variation. At the
same time, observed competition levels are higher in the App Store
than in Google Play both at the store level (the mean of the variable
Turnover is 25 in the App Store and only 5.94 in Google Play) and at
the app level (the mean of the variable Substitutes is 687 in the App
Store and 349 in Google Play). These ﬁgures seem to suggest that the
different levels of in-store competition between the two stores could
play a signiﬁcant role in determining cross-store differences in price of
paid apps. As for our categorical variables, Table 1 clearly suggests that
the top paid apps rankings of the two stores do not display the same
composition in terms of apps. Thus, price differences across the two
platforms might be due to the different apps featured in the rankings
4 In this respect, it is important to note that looking at the turnover over the past week
helps mitigate a potential endogeneity problem due to reverse causality between observed
prices and our store-level competition variable. Also, note that our results are robust even
when considering the newentries of developer in the top 100 paid apps ranking during a dif-
ferent number of days (e.g., 5 or 10) before the given day of observation.
5 In spite of the mentioned weaknesses of using data on the number of developers and
their apps,we found that our results are robust alsowhenusing adailyHHI obtained by com-
puting the market shares as the number of apps (both paid and free) of each developer fea-
tured in the top paid ranking of the given store on the given day divided by the total number
of apps of all the developers featured in the top paid ranking of the same store on the same
day.
6 Note that we distinguish between proper free trial version, i.e., version offering very
limited features or being time-locked, and free version, i.e. version that does not differ
much from the paid version except for the presence of (more) ads. Therefore, we include
a speciﬁc dummy (Free version) to control for the effect of the latter type of version, which
is not related to trialability.
7 An important caveat related to testing our proposed interactions (i.e., H2–H4) is that our
dummy Store embodies two store-level effects. Thus, although the distribution platform
could inﬂuence the price implications of the developers' app-level decisions discussed in
H2–H4, it might be argued such inﬂuence is due to differences in in-store developer compe-
tition rather than to consumer willingness to pay as we propose. In order to rule out this al-
ternative explanationwe also explicitly interacted these app-level decision variableswith the
Turnover variable. Our results showed that these interactions are never signiﬁcant, and thus
the difference in in-store developer competition is unlikely to be the driving forces behind
H2–H4 (this analysis can be made available from the authors upon request).
8 Note that theremight be endogeneity due to potential reverse causality between price
and app rating. In the robustness section, with the support of instrumental variables (IV)
regression, we show this is not the case in our sample.
9 Based on corporate revenue information andworldwide brand recognitionwe identi-
fy 22 top developers in our sample: Activision Blizzard, Adobe Systems, Apple, Autodesk,
AVG Technologies, Capcom, DeAgostini, Disney Interactive, Electronic Arts, FoxDigital En-
tertainment, Gameloft, Google, Konami, Mediaset, Namco Bandai, Research in Motion
(Blackberry), Sega Sammy, Square Enix, Take-Two Interactive, TomTom International
BV, Ubisoft Entertainment, Zynga.
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rather than to the arguments we propose.Wewill carefully address this
issue in the subsequent sectionswhen discussing howmatching similar
apps across stores helps mitigate these potential biases. Table 2 reports
the correlation matrix. First, note that the dummy Store and the store-
level measure of competition are highly correlated (Pearson correlation
coefﬁcient equal to −0.92). At any rate, these two variables are not
introduced at the same time in the regression analyses that follow.
Also note that, in such analyses, we choose the dummy Games and
Medium app rating as baselines for app category and app rating variables,
respectively.
3.3. Methods
Our unbalanced panel dataset naturally displays a multi-level
structure as each observation is related to the daily price of a given
app, marketed by a given developer, in a given store. Hence, observations
related to the same app in the given store, as well as those pertaining to
same developer in the given store are likely to be correlated. Similarly,
observations in the same store could be correlated as they are exposed
to common store-level factors. Therefore, we propose a four-level model
to analyze the role the distribution platform in price formation of paid
apps. The ﬁrst level is the observation (i.e., the app in the given store on
a given day); the second level is the app-store pair (i.e., the app in the
given store), the third level is the developer-store pair (i.e., the developer
in the given store), the fourth level is the store. Essentially, as app stores
can be viewed as different markets, we structure our dataset so that
observations are nested within app-store pairs, which are nested in
developer-store pairs, which in turn are nestedwithin stores. In presence
of such multi-level data structure, the use of mixed linear effects regres-
sionmodels is usually suggested in literature [47]. As we aim at shedding
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for categorical (dummy) variables
Mean (%) Mean (%)
Variables: Total App Store Google Play Variables: Total App Store Google Play
Store 50.00% 0.00% 100.00% Games 38.20% 46.70% 29.70%
Free trial version 15.63% 8.50% 22.77% Healthcare & Fitness 2.83% 3.67% 2.00%
Ads & other revenue streams 8.98% 8.52% 9.45% Money & Finance 0.50% 0.00% 1.00%
Free version 31.86% 24.20% 39.52% Music 5.85% 6.17% 5.53%
In-app purchase 35.91% 44.15% 27.67% News & Info 0.42% 0.83% 0.00%
No app rating 0.96% 1.92% 0.00% Photo & Video 7.57% 11.37% 3.77%
Low app rating 2.43% 4.85% 0.00% Social network 2.10% 2.17% 2.03%
Medium app rating 12.93% 18.23% 7.63% Themes & Customization 7.73% 5.57% 9.88%
High app rating 83.68% 75.00% 92.37% Travel 3.89% 2.75% 5.03%
Developer type 86.03% 84.23% 87.83% TV 0.65% 1.30% 0.00%
Developer fame 22.37% 24.70% 20.04% Utility 21.52% 9.38% 33.66%
Education 1.98% 2.23% 1.72% Weather 3.09% 2.32% 3.87%
Entertainment 3.68% 5.55% 1.80%
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for continuous/integer variables
Total sample App Store Google Play
Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max
App size (Mbyte) 81.59 252.82 0.02 1945.6 108.27 265.56 0.2 1730.6 54.92 236.42 0.02 1945.6
Turnover 15.82 10.92 2 45 25.70 6.13 16 45 5.94 2.42 2 11
Number developer apps 23.73 55.26 1 480 29.90 55.02 1 354 17.57 54.81 1 480
Substitutes 518.54 623.20 0 1665 687.19 743.12 0 1665 349.86 409.45 0 1104
Time since release 575.98 423.14 1 1770 503.40 442.13 2 1770 648.57 390.00 1 1428
Price (€) 2.64 4.05 0.39 49.99 1.87 3.52 0.89 49.99 3.41 4.38 0.39 49.99
Table 2
Correlation matrix.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
(1) Developer type
(2) Developer fame 0.22
(3) Number developer 0.20 0.51
(4) Free trial version 0.08 −0.04 −0.05
(5) Free version 0.02 −0.26 0.00 −0.29
(6) In−app purchase 0.23 0.26 0.26 −0.13 −0.05
(7) Ads & other revenue streams −0.03 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 0.05 0.09
(8) Time since release 0.04 −0.08 −0.03 0.14 0.13 −0.14 0.09
(9) App size (Mbyte) 0.25 0.46 0.30 −0.12 −0.28 0.44 0.00 −0.25
(10) Substitutes 0.14 0.21 0.16 −0.12 −0.10 0.32 −0.01 −0.23 0.24
(11) No app rating −0.05 −0.04 −0.03 −0.04 −0.03 −0.05 −0.02 −0.09 −0.01 −0.01
(12) Low app rating −0.12 −0.04 −0.02 0.01 −0.05 −0.08 0.14 −0.10 −0.07 −0.06 −0.02
(13) Medium app rating −0.07 0.28 0.11 −0.11 −0.19 −0.04 0.07 0.03 0.11 −0.03 −0.04 −0.06
(14) High app rating 0.13 −0.22 −0.08 0.12 0.20 0.08 −0.12 0.04 −0.07 0.06 −0.22 −0.36 −0.87
(15) Store 0.05 −0.06 −0.16 0.20 0.16 −0.17 0.02 0.17 −0.43 −0.14 −0.10 −0.16 −0.16 0.24
(16) Turnover −0.05 0.04 0.14 −0.18 −0.15 0.16 −0.01 −0.16 0.39 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.14 −0.22 −0.92
(17) Price (dep. variable) 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.24 −0.02 −0.16 −0.14 0.24 −0.06 −0.30 −0.05 0.00 −0.10 0.34 −0.32
Pearson correlation coefﬁcients are shown to be signiﬁcant (at 5% level) when above 0.03 in absolute value. Note also that due to space constraints we do not report Pearson correlation
coefﬁcients related to category dummies. At any rate, with regard to independent variables the correlation coefﬁcient between Games and Substitutes (equal to 0.70) is the only relevant
correlation coefﬁcient involving category dummies, but this does not affect our results aswe chooseGames as the baseline category.With regard to the correlation coefﬁcients between our
dependent variable Price and category dummies, they are all signiﬁcant except that between Price and Education.
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light explicitly on the role of the store (Apple vs. Google) in price
formation of paid apps, we introduce the dummy Store, the relative
interaction terms and control variables at both app and developer
levels as ﬁxed effects, while treating as random the effect of the
app-store and developer-store pairs. Hence, our full linearmixed effects
model is:
ln pricetijs ¼ δ0 þ δ1 # Storeþ δ2 þ δ3 # Storeð Þ # Free trial versiontijs
þ δ4 þ δ5 # Storeð Þ # Two sided markettijs þ δ6 þ δ7 # Storeð Þ
# Time since releasetijs þ Β # App Controlstijs
þ Γ # DeveloperControlstjs þ ujs þ rijs þ εtijs
ð1Þ
where, rijs and ujs are the app-store and developer-store speciﬁc
random effects respectively, εtijs is the error term, whereas the
remaining terms are our variables of interests and controls modeled
as ﬁxed effects.
An important concern in assessing the impact of the distribution
platform on prices of paid apps is related to the fact that consumers
and developers might self-select in any of the two stores based on
motives unknown to us. As a result, apps observed in the top ranking
of App Store could be systematically different from those observed for
Google Play. This might generate signiﬁcant selection bias, possibly
invalidating ourﬁndings. In fact, as apps in our sample are not randomly
assigned to the two platforms, cross-store differences in prices could be
simply due to the different types of paid apps featured in the two stores,
rather than to the driving forces we have theorized. Ideally, considering
exactly the same apps in the two stores would arguably solve this issue.
However, only 43 apps out of 567 apps are available in the top 100 paid
apps rankings of both stores during the observation period, thus not
allowing a reliable econometric analysis. Therefore, in order to mitigate
this selection problem and ensure a comparison of relatively similar
apps across stores, we apply the Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
method [50]. To avoid the biases that nonrandom assignment to treat-
ment may generate, matching algorithms are commonly used to ﬁnd a
non-treated unit that is similar to a participating unit across several
dimensions.
We performed the matching based on a set of both categorical as
well as integer/continuous variables, and considered observations in
App Store as treated units, while those in Google Play as non-treated
units.10 We applied PSM within strata, by considering exact matching
for app categories (which identiﬁes the app functionalities) and app
rating levels (a proxy for quality). For instance,wematched games having
high rating in App Store only with games having the same rating in
Google Play, and so forth. Within each of these strata, we applied the
PSM and considered a set of integer/continuous covariates to further
match treated and non-treated apps. We used the variable Time since
release, as stores could feature apps of different maturity. Similarly, we
considered the daily rank of the app to pair apps enjoying similar
exposure to consumers in the two stores. After matching, our sample is
reduced to 3520 observations of which half are from App Store and half
from Google Play, due to the fact that we apply one-to-one matching.
By construction, thesematched samples have the very same composition
in terms of app categories and rating level. Unreported t-tests andANOVA
analyses also conﬁrm that matched apps in the two stores do not differ
signiﬁcantly in terms of age and ranking (covariates used for the
matching), as well as in terms of app size. Hence, we are conﬁdent
that the above matching helps mitigate potential biases in our sample
arising from both consumers' and developers' self-selection in the two
stores. Finally, note that for robustness purposes we created alternative
matched samples by pairing apps also based on additional covariates,11
and implemented alternative matching procedures such as coarsened
exact matching. These additional analyses are fully consistent with
those reported in the paper, and are available from the authors upon
request.
4. Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that on average paid apps have
higher prices in Google Play than in the App Store (3.41 versus 1.87).
This difference seems inconsistent with the intuitive direct effect of
store-level consumer willingness to pay, which should favor higher
prices for paid apps in the App Store. Still, this does not guarantee that
the lower prices in the App Store are the result of the ﬁercer developer
competition in this store. In fact, differences in mean prices might still
be driven by the different app composition in the top paid apps rankings
resulting from the choices of consumers and developers that self-select
in the two platforms. We have pointed out that matching apps accord-
ing to their basic features should reduce (if not eliminate) such potential
biases. Thus, before presenting our more formal regression models
based on (1), we provide some preliminary evidence of the effect of
our matching procedure on our dependent variable, i.e., the app price.
T-test results reported in Table 3 show that signiﬁcant differences
(0.1% level of signiﬁcance) between the average prices of the two stores
emerge even when comparing matched pair of similar apps, although
the magnitude of this difference is considerably reduced (from 1.54 to
0.53).12 Therefore, price differences across the two stores cannot be
explained exclusively by different app composition of the two stores.
Table 3 also reports the cross-store difference in the means of our two
competition measures at both store and app-store levels, i.e., Turnover
and Substitutes, respectively. The results clearly show that, even after
matching similar apps, the two platforms differ signiﬁcantly in terms
of competition with the App Store displaying considerably higher
competition. Overall, this preliminary analysis provides ﬁrst support
to our general argument that the distribution platform could inﬂuence
price formation of paid apps and that the two major app distribution
platforms differ in terms of in-store developer competition.
To test our hypotheses more formally we conduct a number of
regression models based on the mixed linear model presented in
Eq. (1). Given the potential presence of selection bias in the full sample,
we run these models for the matched sample and report the results in
Table 4 (the results under the full sample are qualitatively unchanged
and available from the authors).With regard to our contrasting hypoth-
eses (H1a and H1b), the ﬁrst column of Table 4 shows that Google Play
is associated with higher prices than App Store due to the positive (and
signiﬁcant) coefﬁcient of the dummy Store (δ1 = 0.232 and p b 0.001).
First, this ﬁnding conﬁrms that price levels of paid apps depend on the
store where apps are marketed. Second, it provides support to H1b
against H1a. According to our arguments, this would suggest that the
effect of the lower in-store competition in Google Play prevails over
the opposing effect of the lower consumer willingness to pay in this
store, thus leading to higher prices in this platform than in the App
10 We imposed a common support (overlap condition) with no-replacement by remov-
ing treatment observations for which the propensity scorewas higher than themaximum
or less than the minimum of the score of non-treatment observations. We also used the
caliper options to select one and only one non-treated unit for each treatedunit onlywhen
the propensity score difference was at most 0.001 (i.e., caliper set equal to 0.001).
11 For our main analyses we did not consider the variable App size as one of the features
utilized for the matching, because the app size differ across the two stores, even for the
very same apps. To give the idea, the size of TomTom Italy navigator is 404 Mbyte in
App Store, whereas it is only about 29 Mbyte in Google Play. Therefore, using the size
might actually distort our matching algorithm to the extent that it would not even pair
the very same apps. At any rate, as wewill discuss later, we created several matched sam-
ples based also on the variable App size aswell as other covariates, such as Free trial version,
In-app purchase, and Ads & other revenue streams, showing full robustness of our results.
12 It is noteworthy that the same result is obtained when the t-test is performed using
the sub-sample of 43 apps that are present in both stores. Indeed, evenwith the very same
top paid apps, prices in Google Play are on average higher than those in the App Store at
the level of conﬁdence of 0.36% (t =−2.6889). In spite of the weaknesses entailed by
using such a small sub-sample, this result increases our conﬁdence that our PSM approach
and the resulting ﬁndings on price comparison are fully robust.
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Store. To increase conﬁdence about this interpretation, we substitute
the dummy Store with our competition measure at the store level,
namely Turnover. The second column of Table 4 shows that the coefﬁ-
cient of this variable is negative and strongly signiﬁcant, substantially
capturing the impact of the dummy Store. This result coupled with the
highly signiﬁcant gap in competition between the two platforms
(shown in Table 3) provides strong support to the argument that the
level of in-store competition is themajor driving force behind the over-
all net effect of the distribution platform on prices, thus leading to
higher prices in Google Play for paid apps.
Although results in the ﬁrst two columns support H1b, we provide
evidence that these ﬁndings emerge from a tension between the effects
of the different willingness to pay of consumers in the two stores and
the different in-store competition. Indeed, in columns 3–4 we show
that, while in-store competition seems to explain overall price differences
across stores, the differences in consumer willingness to pay (as implied
by different income levels, frequency of usage and technology conscious-
ness across stores) do actually have a direct impact on price levels of paid
apps. As explained earlier, we take advantage of the cross-sectional vari-
ation in the app value in each store and demonstrate that the store-
level willingness to pay is at work in determining cross-store differences
in app prices by focusing on a sample of low-value paid apps (those in
the lowest price quartile within each of the two app rankings). In pres-
ence of low value (low price) paid apps, cross-store differences in devel-
oper competition should be considerably reduced, thus yielding a limited
impact on cross-store price differences. The reason is that developers in
Google Play (as compared with those in the App Store) tend to concen-
trate more on commercializing low value (low price) apps, rather than
highly valuable (high price) apps, given that they can easily anticipate
that, on average, Android users are more reluctant to pay high prices.
This implies thatwhen considering low value apps the competition levels
between the two stores become similar. In fact, our data show that, while
the average number of app substitutes in Google is roughly only 50% of
that observed in Apple in the full sample, this difference signiﬁcantly
shrinks for the subsample of low-end apps, for which the number of sub-
stitutes in Google is almost 88% of that in Apple. Yet, while competition
levels become more similar, there may still persist differences in terms
of willingness to pay of consumers accessing the different platforms.
Indeed, even for a low-end app, Apple users should be willing to pay
more given that they are on average more afﬂuent and heavier users.
Table 3
Means and relative differences before and after matching.
Means before base matching Means after base matching
App
Store
Google
Play
Mean
difference
App
Store
Google
Play
Mean
difference
Price 1.87 3.41 1.54⁎⁎⁎ 1.60 2.13 0.53⁎⁎⁎
Turnover 25.70 5.94 19.76⁎⁎⁎ 25.68 5.96 19.72⁎⁎⁎
Substitutes 687.19 349.86 337.33⁎⁎⁎ 1050.30 682.37 367.93⁎⁎⁎
Legend: + p b 0.10.
⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎p b 0.001.
Table 4
Distribution platform effect and its interaction with developer decisions at the app level under the matched sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Developer type 0.199** 0.257*** −0.00619 −0.0117 0.185** 0.196** 0.215** 0.198**
(0.0696) (0.0748) (0.00842) (0.00994) (0.0691) (0.0697) (0.0678) (0.0675)
Developer fame 0.246** 0.259** 0.0208* 0.0108 0.243** 0.247** 0.218** 0.217**
(0.0783) (0.0855) (0.00973) (0.0111) (0.0777) (0.0785) (0.0757) (0.0756)
Number developer apps (Ln) −0.0275 −0.0358+ −0.00334 0.00177 −0.0275 −0.0272 −0.0289 −0.0284
(0.0192) (0.0202) (0.00257) (0.00292) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0187) (0.0186)
Free trial version 0.0428 0.0839 −0.0155** −0.0224*** −0.0499 0.0369 0.0520 −0.0363
(0.0488) (0.0510) (0.00579) (0.00615) (0.0576) (0.0490) (0.0482) (0.0575)
Free version −0.0650 −0.0304 0.000421 −0.00572 −0.0360 −0.0644 −0.0906 −0.0649
(0.0580) (0.0608) (0.00548) (0.00607) (0.0581) (0.0579) (0.0569) (0.0572)
In-app purchase −0.0259 −0.0338 −0.00139 −0.00370 −0.0247 −0.0243 −0.0138 −0.0114
(0.0521) (0.0541) (0.00450) (0.00487) (0.0514) (0.0520) (0.0510) (0.0504)
Ads & other revenue streams −0.151 −0.0845 −0.00252 −0.0121+ −0.120 0.0146 −0.163+ 0.0681
(0.100) (0.101) (0.00619) (0.00632) (0.0995) (0.173) (0.0986) (0.169)
Time since release 0.000246*** 0.000168** 0.00000672 0.0000161** 0.000248*** 0.000243*** 0.0000848 0.0000891
(0.0000560) (0.0000593) (0.00000585) (0.00000625) (0.0000554) (0.0000559) (0.0000666) (0.0000663)
App size (Ln) 0.0391** 0.0198 0.000554 0.00409+ 0.0385** 0.0396** 0.0430** 0.0430**
(0.0148) (0.0146) (0.00196) (0.00217) (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0146)
Substitutes (Ln) −0.0585** −0.0756*** 0.0000464 0.00371 −0.0602** −0.0583** −0.0592** −0.0603**
(0.0209) (0.0223) (0.00254) (0.00306) (0.0207) (0.0209) (0.0204) (0.0202)
High app rating 0.0706 0.0763+ 0.00595 0.00820 0.0692 0.0683 0.0751 0.0709
(0.0461) (0.0441) (0.00694) (0.00755) (0.0460) (0.0462) (0.0458) (0.0457)
Store 0.232*** −0.0317*** 0.173** 0.243*** 0.209*** 0.174**
(0.0521) (0.00650) (0.0553) (0.0530) (0.0508) (0.0547)
Turnover (Ln) −0.0345*** −0.00354
(0.00767) (0.00233)
Free trial version × Store 0.305** 0.259*
(0.102) (0.101)
Ads & other revenue streams × Store −0.246 −0.300
(0.210) (0.205)
Time since release × Store 0.000436*** 0.000420***
(0.000102) (0.000102)
App category dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3520 3124 1446 1283 3520 3520 3520 3520
Developer-store obs 262 244 126 117 262 262 262 262
App-store obs 347 322 169 158 347 347 347 347
Wald test — p value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0076 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Legend:+ p b 0.10, * p b 0.05, **p b 0.01, *** p b 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. Note that the constant and the app-store and developer-store pair randomeffects are always strongly
signiﬁcant. Also, no app rating and low rating dummies are not reported as they display no observations in the matched sample.
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Thus, if the role of the distribution platform actually emerges from the
trade-off between these two factors, the positive impact of the dummy
Store should be mitigated in this subsample of apps or eventually revert
as this dummy should mostly capture the direct effect of the store-level
consumer willingness to pay in this case. Results in column 3 conﬁrm
this as the coefﬁcient of the dummy Store becomes signiﬁcant and nega-
tive when we run our mixed model for the subsample of low valuable
apps. This implies higher prices in the App Store in this case as the
cross-store differences in consumer willingness to pay would predict.
The marginal role of competition in presence of low valuable apps is
conﬁrmed by observing that our measures of competition at the app
level and store level (i.e., Turnover and Substitutes) are never signiﬁcant
in columns 3–4. Thus, in the case of low-end apps price differences across
the twoplatforms seem to bemore ascribable to different store-level con-
sumerwillingness to pay than todifferent in-store developer competition.
This set of evidences demonstrates that the impact of the distribution
platform on app prices emerges as the result of a trade-off between the
effect of differences in consumer willingness to pay and the differences
in in-store competition.
Columns 5–8 of Table 4 report the results for our second set of
hypotheses predicting how the distribution platform inﬂuences the
role of some important developers' decisions at the app level in price
formation of paid apps. Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁfth column, we add the
interaction term between the dummy Store and the dummy Free trial
version to the model in column 1. First, note that in column 1 the coefﬁ-
cient of the dummy Free trial versionwas not signiﬁcant, suggesting that
on average trialability does not imply any price premium for the full
paid version. After introducing the interaction term, the coefﬁcient of
this dummy, which now reﬂects the marginal change in price due to
trialability in the App Store, is still not signiﬁcant. However, the coefﬁ-
cient of the interaction term,which instead reﬂects themarginal change
in price in Google Play due to trialability, is largely signiﬁcant (at the 1%
level) with a positive sign (δ3 = 0.305), thus supporting our H2, which
suggests that the impact of a free trial version on the price of the full
paid version is more likely to be associated with Google Play. As we
have argued, consumers in Google Play perceive higher risks in buying
an app of unknown value than consumers in the App Store due to their
lower willingness to pay. Thus, they seem to be willing to recognize a
price premium to developers offering a free trial version to resolve the
uncertainty surrounding the value of the paid version.
In the sixth column we add the interaction term between the
dummy Store and the dummy Ads & other revenue streams to our
baseline model shown in column 1 (where the latter variable was
not signiﬁcant). We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients of the latter dummy
and its interaction term with the distribution platform are both not
signiﬁcant. Therefore, H3 is not conﬁrmed in our sample, and apps
generating revenue from third parties interested in app users
(e.g., advertisers) do not seem to be associated with signiﬁcantly
different prices across the two platforms.
In the seventh column we add the interaction term between the
dummy Store and the variable Time since release to the baseline model
in column 1. The coefﬁcient of this variable was shown to be strongly
signiﬁcant with a positive sign in column 1, which suggested that, on
average, developers increase prices as apps move forward in their
lifecycle, consistent with the adoption of a penetration price policy.
However, after adding the interaction term, the coefﬁcient on the
variable Time since release, which now reﬂects the marginal change in
price in the App Store due to an increase in the app age, is no longer
signiﬁcant. Conversely, the interaction of this variable with the dummy
Store, which now reﬂects the marginal change in price in Google Play
due to an increase in the age of the app, is signiﬁcant with a positive
sign (δ7 = 0.0004 and p b 0.001). This result supports H4, by showing
that price penetration is more impactful in Google Play than in App
Store, arguably because the segment of consumers characterized by
high willingness to pay could be relatively less developed in the former
platform to allow the adoption of price skimming scheme. The last
column of Table 4 reports our full model including all three interaction
terms and shows full consistencywith the results in the previousmodels.
At this point, it is important to recall that the results in Table 4 are
based on a subsample obtained by matching apps according their
basic characteristics. Therefore, one could argue that the results on the
interactions between the distribution platform and app-level decisions
might be still biased by the fact the two rankings display different
composition in terms of percentage of free trial version, app embed-
ding ads, and so forth. Nevertheless, even after reﬁning our matching
procedure by exactly matching also for all app-level decisions
variables (e.g., observations of apps offering a free trial version in
App Store matched only with observations of apps offering free trial
version in Google Play, and so forth), our ﬁndings remain unchanged in
spite of a considerable reduction in the number of observations (from
3520 to 1520).13
5. Robustness checks and further discussion
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss the results of additional analyses
we conducted to test the robustness of our ﬁndings. The details of all
the following robustness checks are available from the authors. First,
our results are qualitatively unchanged when eliminating those apps
featured in the top paid app ranking sporadically (e.g., less than three
or four occurrences) to ensure comparison among apps of similar suc-
cess. Our second extension addresses potential endogeneity concerns
related to time-varying app characteristics. Speciﬁcally, while in the
models above we control for unobserved app quality by means of app
rating, we do not control for the potential effect of mobile app trend
due to advertising or online word-of-mouth. As we do not have access
to explicit information about the advertising expenditures or the extent
of word-of-mouth, we use a proxy that reﬂects the mobile app trend
over time. Speciﬁcally, we use the tool Google Trend provided by
Google, which provides a weekly index on a 0–100 scale of search
popularity of words on Google search engine in speciﬁc geographical
regions. We recorded such weekly index during our period of observa-
tion by searching the exact name of all the apps in our sample. Given
the popularity of Google search engine, this measure reﬂects the trend
of an app in a given period, as a higher index is the result of greater
knowledge and interest about the product, which, in turn, is likely to
be the consequence of more effective advertising and online word-of-
mouth over time. While being not signiﬁcant, this new variable does
not change our main results. Our ﬁndings are also robust when we
include one dummy for each day of observation to account for the effect
of trends common to both app stores and all observed apps.
Finally, endogeneity concerns might emerge also from reverse
causality in the relationship between price and app rating. Indeed, the
rating of an app might be affected by the price of the same app as a
higher price might create higher expectations of consumers, who will
be more likely to complain about product ﬂaws and provide lower rat-
ings to the given app. To address this concern, we perform instrumental
variables (IV) regression models, where we use, as instruments for the
app-level rating, the above weekly popularity index, which has been
shown not to inﬂuence the price at all, and more importantly, the aver-
age rating of all the apps (except the considered app) marketed by the
developer in the given store until the given day. We refer to the latter
measure as the developer rating. However, it is important to note that
app stores do not compute and display any developer rating to
consumers, they only display app ratings. The app rating is the ofﬁcial
mechanism provided by app stores through which consumers can
express their level of satisfaction upon using an app, and thus themech-
anism through which app quality can be publicized in order to increase
consumers' trust. As such, it is the app rating (and not our ad-hoc mea-
sure of developer rating) that can potentially have direct inﬂuence on
13 The analysis under this reﬁned matching procedure is available from authors upon
request.
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consumers' willingness to pay and in turn the app price. Indeed, the fact
that nodeveloper rating is displayed to consumers considerably reduces
the chances that our measure will have a direct effect on prices [39],
thus making it a suitable instrument. The impact of our measure on
price, if any, will only be indirect, i.e., via the app rating. The rationale
is that a developerwhohas historicallymarketed apps capable of gener-
ating a high level of user satisfaction (i.e., highly rated apps) apps is
more likely to commercialize an app capable meeting the favor of
users (i.e., a highly rated app) than a developer that has historically
marketed poorly rated apps. Indeed, the fact that a developer has
received higher ratings than other developers for all other marketed
apps suggests that this developer possesses better capabilities to
commercialize apps that ﬁt customers' needs than developers who are
received lower ratings. The impact of our measure of developer rating
on app rating is indeed shown to be strongly signiﬁcant (about 1%
level of signiﬁcance) fromourﬁrst stage IV regression.More importantly,
as both exogeneity test and the Sargan–Hansen overidentiﬁcation test
(which evaluates the statistical validity of instruments) are insigniﬁcant,
we can be conﬁdent that our ﬁndings are not affected by potential
endogeneity concerns due to the app rating variable. At any rate, theﬁnd-
ings are robust even under the IV regression model.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have contributed to the literature on price forma-
tion in online markets by examining the unique role of online distribu-
tion platform, speciﬁcally App Store vs. Google Play, in price formation
of paid apps. We have argued that differences in price levels across
different stores emerge as a result of the different consumer segments
and market conditions facing developers in different app stores.
In detail our ﬁndings are as follows. First, price levels of paid apps
strongly depend on the targeted distribution platform, and speciﬁcally
Google Play is associated with higher prices on average than App Store
for paid apps. The platform effect emerges as a result of contrasting
factors. On the one hand, the higher consumer willingness to pay in
the App Store, as implied by their higher income and frequency of
usage and lower technology consciousness, plays in favor of higher
prices for paid apps in this store. On the other hand, the lower competi-
tion in Google Play, as implied by the lower willingness to pay of its
customers and by the higher customization costs in this store, pushes
in the opposite direction. Our ﬁndings suggest that in general differences
in developer competition at the store level seem to bemore inﬂuential in
determining different prices across the two stores than differences in
average consumer willingness to pay. Further conﬁrming the existence
of a trade-off, we ﬁnd that price differences across stores are actually
reversed for the restricted subsample of low value apps. Second, our
ﬁndings suggest that the distribution platform heavily impacts on
the price implications of two important app-level decisions made
by developers. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that price premiums on the full
paid version of the app as a return to the provision of a free trial version
are more likely to be observed in Google Play, where consumers are
more likely to suffer from product value uncertainty given their more
limited willingness to pay. Also, the distribution platform appears to
be important for the introductory pricing policy used when launching
new apps. In this respect, we ﬁnd developers are more likely to use a
penetration price policy in Google Play, whereas they possibly use
both penetration price and price skimming strategies in App Store.
The rationale is that the segment of highly valuable consumers could
be relatively less developed in Google Play to favor the adoption of a
price skimming scheme. Finally, no evidence supports the claim that
the decision to monetize from third parties interested in app users
(e.g., advertisers) should yield a larger price reduction in Google Play
than in App Store as a result of the lower willingness to pay of
consumers accessing the former store.
These ﬁndings offer several remarkable implications for more
informed decisions in the app market. A primary implication of our
ﬁndings is that app developers need to ﬁne-tune their pricing decisions
to the targeted store, as different platforms imply different types of con-
sumers, different app customization costs, and ultimately also different
levels of developer competition. Also, they need to take into account the
role of the distribution platform when making app-level decisions,
especially those related to free trial version release and introductory
price for new apps. Indeed, the price implications of such decisions
depend on the distribution platform. Finally, our ﬁndings help increase
distribution platform owners' awareness on the role of store-level
factors in price formation and rethink their strategies to attract both
users and developers.
We expect that many researchers will devote themselves to the
study of the app market given its growing popularity. Accordingly, we
believe that there is large room for further investigating the role of the
distribution platform. For instance, the same questions posed in this
paper could be addressed by using a modeling approach. Also, to com-
plement our empirical study, it would be interesting to investigate
whether developer choices related to app characteristics are inﬂuenced
by the store choice, thus going beyond their mere price implication as
done here. Further research could also examine the factors guiding
developers in the choice of the platform when launching a new app.
Speciﬁcally, this direction could provide answers to questions such as
whether to launch the new app only in one store, which store to target
ﬁrst, whether to make simultaneous entry, and the relative rationale
and performance implications of such choices.
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